Private hospitals should be having the easiest decade of their existence. NHS waiting lists have pushed record volumes of taxpayer-funded operations into private theatres, insurers are growing, and self-pay has become a mainstream way to jump the queue — every major acute hospital group in Britain grew its revenue last year. And yet, across the 181 UK hospital companies that publish a full profit-and-loss — £10.3bn of combined turnover — the operators struggle to keep the money. Spire’s operating company lost £41.3M before tax on £1.33bn; HCA’s main London entity lost £88.7M; Cleveland Clinic London lost £131.0M building its way into the market. Meanwhile the most reliable margins in the entire category belong to companies that never see a patient: the private-finance vehicles behind NHS hospitals, which collect index-linked availability payments at 10–46% margins for owning and maintaining the buildings. In UK hospitals, the wards carry the risk and the concrete keeps the profit. Figures are approximate — verify against a company’s own accounts before relying on any single number.
Read the register first
Three things change how you read every number below, so they come first.
“Hospital company” means at least three different businesses. The label covers the acute and mental-health groups that actually treat patients; a tier of PFI special-purpose vehicles — companies like Consort Healthcare (Durham) that financed, built and maintain an NHS hospital and are repaid through decades of availability payments; and a scatter of businesses that share the label without sharing the trade at all — Macmillan Cancer Support (a fundraising charity, £245.5M of income), Gama Healthcare (disinfectant wipes, not wards) and Alliance Medical (scanning, which belongs to the diagnostic-imaging story). The competitive reads below separate them; the headline totals don’t.
A statutory loss at an operating company is not “the hospital loses money on patients”. The big groups run their UK hospitals through stacks of entities, and rent, intercompany interest and group charges land unevenly across the layers. Spire’s operating company shows a £41.3M pre-tax loss while its listed parent’s consolidated accounts show £1.5bn of revenue and rising profit; HCA’s £88.7M entity loss (which includes a one-off £55M impairment of a subsidiary investment) sits alongside a £50.9M profit at its sister company St Martins Healthcare, through which the same American group books part of its London business. Entity-level losses here are mostly a story about capital structure and where the group puts its costs — the genuinely alarming lines are the ones where revenue and headcount are falling together.
What you can see is not the whole market. Nuffield Health — one of the biggest names in UK private hospitals — is a charity, reports a surplus rather than a profit, and sits outside this set entirely, as do the hospital arms buried inside Bupa’s £18bn and the NHS’s own private patient units. The 181 companies here are the visible, commercial core of the market, not its full extent.
The giants: growth everywhere, profit in patches
| Company | What it is | Turnover | PBT | Staff | TO YoY | Staff YoY |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Spire Healthcare | listed acute group (39 hospitals), operating company | £1.33bn | −£41.3M | 10,489 | +5% | +5% |
| Circle Health Group | acute group (ex-BMI), Abu Dhabi-owned | £1.21bn | £29.3M | 7,560 | +7% | +2% |
| Priory Group UK 1 | mental health & addiction, foreign-owned | £794.2M | −£66.1M | 14,971 | −3% | −2% |
| Ramsay Health Care UK | acute group, Australian-listed parent | £738.9M | £22.2M | 6,848 | +7% | +6% |
| Cygnet Health UK | mental-health hospitals, US-owned | £680.6M | £52.5M | 12,354 | +11% | +7% |
| HCA International | US giant’s central-London hospitals (one of several entities) | £657.8M | −£88.7M | 5,366 | +4% | +5% |
| Macmillan Cancer Support | fundraising charity — not an operator | £245.5M | — | 1,697 | +6% | −11% |
| Alliance Medical | diagnostic imaging, not a hospital | £211.9M | −£50.1M | 1,014 | +5% | −1% |
| St Martins Healthcare | HCA group entity — reads with the row above | £209.1M | £50.9M | 1,088 | +1% | −3% |
| The London Clinic | charitable Harley Street hospital | £186.0M | −£22.7M | 1,287 | +7% | +0% |
| Cleveland Clinic London | US non-profit’s London build-out | £185.2M | −£131.0M | 1,687 | +25% | +8% |
| Livewell Southwest | NHS-commissioned community services CIC | £158.7M | £324k | 2,994 | −4% | −1% |
The demand story is unambiguous: every genuine acute operator in the table grew revenue, most while hiring. What splits them is what happens below the revenue line. Circle (the former BMI estate, bought by Abu Dhabi’s PureHealth), Ramsay and Cygnet turn a profit; Spire’s and HCA’s operating entities, The London Clinic and Cleveland Clinic don’t — for reasons that range from group financing structures to the brutal cost of building a new London hospital from scratch. Cleveland Clinic London is the starkest: +25% revenue growth, still hiring, and a £131.0M pre-tax loss — an American non-profit paying whatever it takes to establish a Grosvenor Place flagship.
The mental-health half of the table tells its own story. Priory and Cygnet run labour armies — roughly 15,000 and 12,400 staff on £794M and £681M respectively, twice the staff-per-pound of the acute groups — yet they diverge completely: Cygnet grew 11% at a £52.5M profit, while Priory is shrinking on both axes and lost £66.1M. When revenue and headcount fall together, that’s contraction, not efficiency.
The shape of the market
Profitability in this category is strongest in the middle and weakest at the top. The £25–100M band — single-site hospitals, specialist clinics and PFI vehicles — is 69% profitable; the £100M–1bn band, where the big groups’ entities live, is only 36% profitable. That inversion is rare across the markets we’ve mapped, and it’s the thesis in one chart: scale in UK hospitals buys revenue, not margin.
| Turnover band | n | Profitable % |
|---|---|---|
| < £1M | 47 | 26% |
| £1–5M | 21 | 67% |
| £5–25M | 52 | 65% |
| £25–100M | 45 | 69% |
| £100M–1bn | 14 | 36% |
| £1bn+ | 2 | 50% |
The companies that treat no patients
Filter the mid-market for the fattest, steadiest margins and you don’t find hospitals — you find the PFI vehicles that built them for the NHS. These are single-purpose companies that raised the finance for a hospital in the late 1990s or 2000s, own or maintain the building, and are repaid through availability payments from an NHS trust for 30-odd years: index-linked, government-backed revenue with no patients, no clinical risk, and in most cases no employees.
| Company | The hospital behind it | Turnover | PBT | Margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| The Hospital Company (QAH Portsmouth) | Queen Alexandra Hospital, Portsmouth | £77.8M | £9.3M | 12.0% |
| Endeavour SCH | James Cook University Hospital, Middlesbrough | £67.7M | £11.6M | 17.1% |
| Worcestershire Hospital SPC | Worcestershire Royal Hospital | £64.4M | £9.1M | 14.2% |
| Consort Healthcare (Birmingham) | Queen Elizabeth Hospital Birmingham | £54.0M | £5.7M | 10.6% |
| Prospect Healthcare (Hairmyres) | Hairmyres Hospital, East Kilbride | £27.3M | £4.5M | 16.5% |
| Consort Healthcare (Durham) | University Hospital of North Durham | £20.7M | £9.6M | 46.2% |
| Summit Holdings (Wishaw) | University Hospital Wishaw | £12.4M | £4.2M | 34.1% |
| HPC King’s College Hospital | King’s College Hospital, London | £11.1M | £2.8M | 25.6% |
Several of these file through paired holding layers (QAH Portsmouth and HPC King’s each appear twice in the raw data with identical figures); the table shows each scheme once. Their margins are not comparable with an operator’s — this is project-finance income against debt service and lifecycle maintenance, a different business wearing the same label. The “margin” shown is pre-tax profit over turnover, and for Durham that profit includes £4.6M of finance-debtor interest income that never passes through turnover — which is how its ratio can exceed its 25.8% operating margin.
Eight of the twenty best mid-market margins in the category belong to this tier. Consort Healthcare (Durham) keeps 46.2% of £20.7M for the hospital it financed in the 1990s; the Wishaw vehicle keeps 34.1%. Whatever you think of PFI as policy, the accounts are unambiguous about who ended up with the safest economics in British healthcare: not the surgeons, not the hospital groups — the vehicles that own the buildings. Nor is the tier uniformly safe, though: Consort Healthcare (Birmingham)‘s 10.6% exists only because its noteholder waived £13.8M of subordinated interest amid fire-protection disputes — the vehicle lost £22.5M the year before, carries a shareholders’ deficit, and its auditor flags a material uncertainty over going concern. Some of these vehicles are distressed, not serene. Their “growth” is equally synthetic: HPC King’s +33% year on year is indexation and lifecycle billing, not a business winning customers.
The operators worth studying
Strip out the PFI tier, the group layers (St Martins, Hathor Chelsea — a 64%-margin, 12-employee entity registered at the same address — and London Endoscopy Centre, a day-case unit that keeps a category-best 46.8% of £21.5M but is an HCA UK subsidiary whose directors’ £2.67M pay is borne by the holding company, flattering the margin; all three read as parts of HCA’s London structure, not competitors) and the mis-filed product businesses (Gama Healthcare’s 19% margin is earned on disinfectant wipes; Pajunk UK distributes anaesthesia needles; Ergea manages imaging equipment with six staff), and a genuinely instructive set of independent operators remains:
| Company | What it does | Turnover | PBT | Margin | Trajectory |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Optegra UK | eye-hospital group | £99.8M | £16.8M | 16.8% | growing |
| Kingsbridge Private Hospital North West | Northern Ireland private hospital group | £54.4M | £8.3M | 15.3% | growing |
| Circle Hospital (Reading) | Circle’s purpose-built Reading hospital | £33.2M | £4.7M | 14.2% | stable |
| Clifton Park Hospital | York orthopaedic hospital — a Ramsay joint venture with its surgeons | £22.2M | £4.1M | 18.6% | growing |
| Independent British Healthcare (Doncaster) | independent Doncaster hospital | £13.2M | £2.9M | 21.9% | stable |
| Rushcliffe Independent Hospitals (Kegworth) | NHS-commissioned mental-health hospital (Mill Lodge, Kegworth) | £7.8M | £2.2M | 28.0% | growing |
The pattern among the elective players is consistent and it is the inverse of the giants: single site, elective, specialist. Eyes and hips — high-volume procedures with predictable theatre time, no A&E, no 4,000-bed estate to heat. Optegra has built a £100M eye-surgery business at 16.8% while growing, and Clifton Park earns 18.6% on York orthopaedics. The best independent economics cluster exactly where NHS waiting lists are longest — cataracts and orthopaedics. These are the businesses converting the backlog into margin; the full-service giants convert it into revenue. The row that doesn’t fit the elective story is Rushcliffe Independent Hospitals: its 28.0% margin and +27% growth come from Mill Lodge, a 27-bed NHS-commissioned mental-health hospital ramping up after opening — a different trade riding a different queue.
Growth, read with care
The fastest headline growth in the category is mostly not hospital operators winning patients. Enviva Complex Care (+89%) is home-based complex care, not a hospital; Interhealth Canada (+48%) builds and manages hospitals overseas; the +33% at HPC King’s is a PFI vehicle’s indexation; and Cleveland Clinic London’s +25% came at a £131.0M loss. The genuine article is smaller and quieter: Lister Fertility @ Portland Hospital (+44% to £6.5M at a 12.2% margin, staff +26% — fertility demand inside HCA’s Portland Hospital) — profitable growth backed by hiring, the combination that means what it appears to mean. Rushcliffe Independent Hospitals (+27% at a 28.0% margin, hiring) is profitable and staffed-up too, but its growth is a newly commissioned NHS mental-health unit ramping up, not elective demand.
Market structure
The 181 companies book £10.3bn between them, and the top five hold 46.1% of it. True operator concentration is higher still: strip the charities, the imaging business and the community-services CIC out of the top twelve and UK private hospital care is essentially six groups — Spire, Circle, HCA (across its entities), Ramsay, Cygnet and Priory — over a long tail of single-site independents. That structure explains the margin map above: the six compete with each other (and with the NHS’s own private units) on national coverage and insurer contracts, while the single-site specialists compete with a waiting list.
| Share of turnover | |
|---|---|
| Top 5 companies | 46.1% |
| Top 10 companies | 60.7% |
| Top 20 companies | 73.0% |
| Top 50 companies | 89.9% |
Ownership and vintage
Almost nothing about UK private hospitals is British-owned anymore. Of the six major groups, one is London-listed (Spire), one belongs to Abu Dhabi’s PureHealth (Circle), two are American (HCA; Cygnet’s parent is a US hospital giant), one Australian (Ramsay) and one — Priory — sits under a European buyout-backed group. The charities (The London Clinic, the hospices, Nuffield outside this set) are the last big domestically-controlled institutions in the category. Lower down, about 14% of companies carry a Holdings/Bidco/Topco-style name, the structural fingerprint of private equity — Optegra, the best-run independent, is itself a buyout-built platform, now being acquired by eyewear giant EssilorLuxottica.
The vintage chart carries the PFI story in its shape: the 2000s cohort (65 companies) is the largest by far — the era when hospital-building deals were signed and their vehicles incorporated — and entry has since all but stopped. Two companies since 2021. Building a hospital is the highest barrier to entry in this whole healthcare series, and Cleveland Clinic’s £131M loss is the price tag on the door.
What the map shows
- Demand is not the question. Every major acute group grew revenue — Spire +5%, Circle +7%, Ramsay +7%, Cygnet +11%, HCA +4% — on NHS waiting-list outsourcing, insurance and self-pay.
- The operators don’t reliably keep it. The £100M–1bn band is only 36% profitable; Spire’s and HCA’s operating entities, The London Clinic and Cleveland Clinic all show pre-tax losses — though entity losses often reflect group rent and financing, not the wards.
- The surest profits treat no patients. Eight PFI vehicles sit among the best mid-market margins, from 10.6% (Birmingham) to 46.2% (Durham) — index-linked availability payments for owning the buildings.
- The independent sweet spot is single-site elective specialism. Eyes and orthopaedics: Optegra keeps 16.8% at £100M and Clifton Park 18.6% — the waiting-list backlog converted into margin rather than just revenue. (The fattest “independent” margin in the category, London Endoscopy Centre’s 46.8%, turns out to be another HCA group entity whose director costs sit at the holding company.)
- Mental health splits in two. Cygnet (+11%, £52.5M profit) and Priory (−3%, −£66.1M, shrinking headcount) run near-identical labour-heavy models to opposite ends.
- Nobody new is coming. Two entrants since 2021, and the one serious recent attempt — Cleveland Clinic London — has the deepest losses in the category.
Methodology and caveats
This covers the 181 UK hospital companies that publish a full profit-and-loss, of roughly 689 in the category — the rest file abridged or dormant accounts. Large groups run through multiple entities: HCA’s London business spans at least four companies here (HCA International, St Martins Healthcare, Hathor Chelsea, London Endoscopy Centre), Spire’s row is its main operating company rather than its listed group, and the PFI schemes’ paired holding layers are shown once — so the £10.3bn headline total counts some money twice and no single entity’s profit or loss describes its group. Nuffield Health, a charity, sits outside this set entirely, and charities within it (Macmillan, The London Clinic, the hospices) report surpluses and deficits, not commercial profit. Margins are not comparable across the category’s different models — patient-treating operators, PFI project-finance vehicles, product distributors and group service entities answer to different economics — and each row uses the latest accounts available when the data was assembled, so newer figures may since have appeared. Figures are approximate and business descriptions are directional. This is analysis, not financial advice — verify any specific figure against the company’s own accounts.